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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY:
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE 1977-1979
by Walter Kolvenbach*
INTRODUCTION
The announcement that Mr. Douglas A. Fraser, President of the
United Auto Workers union, is a candidate for election as a director
of the Board of Chrysler Corporation, 1 once again has focused the
attention of the United States of America on the codetermination
systems already existing or being discussed in a number of European
countries. It is obvious that for the American labor relations system
and for corporate lawyers, this move raises many legal problems.
Such problems have become all too familiar to Europeans.2
* General Counsel of Henkel KGaA, Dusseldorf, Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Dr. Jur. (Cologne) 1949, member of the German Bar since 1952. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance rendered by Professor Ernst Stiefel
in the publication of this article.
I. This announcement found worldwide publicity because until now it
was generally believed that "the American legacy of individualism and distrust
for government control will prevent what has happened in Europe from arriving
here." Mills, Europe's Industrial Democracy: an American Response, HARV.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 143.
2. Richard M. Steuer raised the question in 1977 whether "employee
representation would be lawful in the United States, and specifically, whether it
would contravene our antitrust laws." Steuer, Employee Representation on the
Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking Directorate?, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 255 (1977). See also Plan to Elect UAW's Chief to Chrysler's
Board Raises Issues, Wall St. I., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col. 4; Steuer, Labor on the
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Traditionally, codetermination, as a means by which employees
participate in decision-making at the shop or board levels, has been
regarded merely as a concern of labor law. More recent experiences
demonstrate that, in those countries which make legal provision for
codetermination, the results pervade the entire field of company law.
An increasing number of nations on the Continent are enacting
detailed, comprehensive statutes on the matter. The Western Euro-
pean labor movements seek to resolve issues affecting the workplace
through political and legislative means instead of by collective bar-
gaining. This contrasts with the United States' approach, wherein a
decentralized trade union structure negotiates with the employer
over the problems of the workplace; political questions are deemed
extraneous to .the "traditions and interests of the American labor
movement." 3 In view of the new developments, it seems appropriate
to quote Peter F. Drucker: "Thus, it seems apparent that co-
determination, even where it is merely debated and then set aside, is
an explosive issue that has important political as well as social rami-
fications. We in this country would do well to pay greater attention
to this issue."
4
The right of employees to participate in management decisions
is recognized by almost all European political parties. Typically,
the President of France, M. Giscard d'Estaing, stated in 1976, "Par-
ticipation of workers' representatives in the life of their company
reflects the workers' aspirations not to be left out of decisions that
concern them." (However, it is unclear whether the British Con-
servatives, now returned to power, still would go as far as to say,
"Employees' interests should now be fully recognized by giving them
rights which are comparable to those of shareholders." ) For the
main part, worker participation, industrial democracy and its insti-
tutions will continue to advance in the 1980's in every European
country. While assuming different forms in different countries, it
is encouraged by strong support from the EEC Commission in
Board-Director's Seat for the UAW Stirs Antitrust Issue, National L. J., Nov.
26, 1979 at 19; Hayes, Fraser Board Role Riles Critics, Raises Questions, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26,1979, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
3. Ellenberger, The Realities of Co-Determination, AFL-CIO FEDERA-
TIONIST. Oct. 1977, at 15.
4. The Battle Over Co-Determination, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1977, at 14,
col. 3.
5. V. GIscARo D'ESTAING, DEMOCRATIE FRANCANSE (1976).





In general, participation is instituted first at the shop-floor level,
normally by the establishment of works councils or similar institu-
tions.8 They are the first step in the establishment of participative
institutions, often followed by the election or appointment of em-
ployees to the board of directors. Some European countries allow
participation solely at the shop-floor level while others also allow
employees to participate in the management or supervisory organ
of the company.
Unfortunately, the preferred equivalents in English to describe
the pertinent phenomena vary: "industrial democracy," "partici-
pative democracy," "worker participation," "co-gestion," (actually
French) and "codetermination." Even in countries wherein they
originated, disagreement exists as to the precise meanings of these
terms. There are many forms of employee representation in indus-
try which assume their own constitution, powers, and objectives,
yet lack proper terminological differentiation as, for example, works
council, joint council, and comit' d'entreprise. Hence, identical
titles in the original language may not represent similarity in nature
and function any more than distinct titles necessarily correlate with
separateness of structure; translation without in-depth description
has compounded the confusion.
What are the objectives of Industrial Democracy?
Working conditions were influenced as strongly by mechaniza-
tion in the last century as they are now by automation and com-
puterization. The division of labor and the rise of large industrial
units were two early results. A more recent result is the drive for
the humanization of work at the factory level, including more
democratic decision-making. Among the phrases often used in this
connection are "better quality of life," both at work and beyond,
and "social responsibility" of the enterprise for the consumer as
well as the employee.
9
7. Hudson Research Europe, European Trade Unions, Labour Move-
ments and Worker Participation .1990 at 54 (1977) (paper prepared for the 7th
International Management Symposium Davos, held May 23-25, 1977) ("the par-
ticipation gospel has spread like a wild fire").
8. The existing statutes and agreements on works councils are sum-
marized and printed in English in w. KOLVENBACH. EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN
EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978).
9. Humanizing Work, Industrial Society's Next Task, ATLAS REPORT,
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Industrial Democracy assumes different forms in different coun-
tries but it has a common definition: that each individual in the
work organization should share in the information and power rele-
vant to the decisions affecting him. The extent to which the indi-
vidual partakes of information, power and decision-making serves as
the point of departure for the various humanistic movements. 10 In-
dustrial democracy has created information rights and, in some coun-
tries, decision rights, for a large number of employees.
Of course, an inalienable part of democracy is precisely the
right of the individual to free personal development. Yet, the con-
comitant and unresolved question arises concerning the limit at-
tached to this freedom by the protection of minority rights.
11
A survey published by the Anglo-German Foundation on
December 12, 1979, and based on field work in 14 British com-
panies shows that the amount of involvement in decision-making at
work is "astonishingly low." Conversely, there was wide agreement
among those questioned that greater employee participation would
lead to better decisions. 72% of the survey respondents thought
that employee representation on boards was desirable. 12  It is
interesting to compare the result of this survey with British studies
in 1975, wherein a "substantial proportion of individuals felt that
they should be informed, but not necessarily further involved, in
decision-making processes."
1 3
Another interesting survey concerning the effectiveness of co-
operation between works councils and management in the Federal
Republic of Germany showed that the relationship between these
two institutions in the enterprise is better than surmised. 1700
companies with a total of 4.1 million employees participated.
14
61% of the participating enterprises report that frequent dis-
June 1977, at 31.
10. Prasat, The Growth of Co-Determination, BUSNESS HORIZONS, April
1977.
11. C. BALFOUR. PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY 3 (1973).
12. Participation in Industry, Fin. Times, Dec. 13, 1979, at 9, col. I.
The report shows a gap between actual and desired participation in the United
Kingdom.
13. Hespe & Wall, Demand for mployee Participation, 29 HUMAN RELA-
TONS 426 (1976).
14. The survey was conducted by Institut der Dcutschen Wirtschaft.
The results were published in Blick durch dic Wirtschaft, Nov. 8, 1979 and
Handelsblatt, Nov. 12, 1979, at 6.
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cussions between the works council and management take place. 28%
have these discussions monthly, 3% every two weeks and 9% weekly.
The sessions last an average of 2 hours each, personal and social
matters are discussed. In personal matters the works councils as
well as management initiated such discussion in 43% of all relevant
situations. The legal possibility of including union representatives
not employed in the enterprise has been used often by 6% of the
firms, occasionally by 58%, and never by 36%.
It is interesting also to examine costs. For the average em-
ployee's year, they are roughly DM 179. Total expenses for an en-
terprise with 500 employees run from DM 80,000 to DM 95,000;
enterprises with 10,000 employees list annual expenses between
DM 1.5 and 1.8 million, and enterprises with 100,000 employees list
DM 15 to 18 million. These figures show that the works councils are
also a cost-intensive factor.
The German Shop-Constitution Act provides for a certain num-
ber of works council members to be paid and relieved from work.
Thus, 10% of all members are free from work to act as fulltime
works council members. Almost 75% of the workforce participate
in works meetings, which are convoked by the works council at least
once per year.
The Historical Development of Industrial Democracy.
Worker representation has been discussed since the beginning
of the Industrial Age. In the British printing and foundry industries
shop stewards were elected as early as 1824 and 1831,15 respec-
tively. During the years 1848 and 1849, the National Constitutional
Assembly (Verfassungsgebende Nationalversammlung) meeting in the
Paulskirche at Frankfurt Main, Germany, drafted and discussed an
amendment to the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung) in accordance
with which the employees in each factory would elect a "Factory-
committee" as jointly representative of employers and employees.
While this amendment never came into effect, rights which these
committees would have had resemble strongly the co-determination
rights which similar institutions enjoy in many European countries
today.
In 1891, a German law first mentioned "worker committees"
which could be regarded as forerunners of the modern works coun-
cil. The term "Industrial Democracy" appeared for the first time
15. J. HmTON, THE FIRST SHOP-STEWARDS MOVEMENT 78 (1973).
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in 1902.16 The Austrian Constitutional National Assembly enacted
a law establishing employee representation in factories] and the
Constitution of the German Reich (Weimarer Verfassung) devoted
particular attention to worker representation. 18 This article was
implemented by the Works Council Law of February 4, 192019
and had considerable influence on the development of the principle
of employee representation in other European countries. 2 0  The
first law on the appointment of works council members to the
supervisory board of companies was passed by the German Reichstag
on February 15, 1922.21
It was only after World War II that worker representation in
the decision-making process at shop floor and board levels became
political issues.
THE REALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY.
Three main forms of worker participation have been developed:
a) Participation in the decision-making process at the shop-
floor level through works councils (or similar institutions) or in some
countries, especially the United Kingdom and Ireland, through shop
stewards;
b) Participation in the decision-making process at the board
level through employee directors; and
c) Participation through ownership in the company (Asset-
16. S. WEBB & B. WEBB. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1902).
17. Law of May 1-5, 1919, betreffend die Errichtung von Betriebstraten,
119191 STAATSGESETZBLATT FUR OEN STAAT DEUTSCH-OsTERREICH 651.
18. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN RECHES VOM 11.8.1919 (1926).
Article 65 states: "The workers and salaried employees shall have for the pro-
tection of their social and economic interests legal representation in works
councils, in regional works councils in every economic area and in a Reichs
works council."
19. 119201 REICHSGESETZBLATT IRGB1I 147; 1920 ILO LEG. SER.
Ger. 1.
20. FLATOW, BETRIEBSRATEGESETZ VOM 4.2.1920 (1927). Flatow men-
tions as important foreign publications M. BERTHELOT. LES CoNSEILS o'ENTRE-
P ,sE EN ALLEMAGNE (1926); B. STERN, WORKS COUNCIL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY
(1925); G. VANOENBERGH, DE MEDEZEGGEN-SCHAP DER ARBEIDERS IN DE PAR-
TCULRE OONDERNEMING (1924); c. w. GULLEBAUD. THE WORKS COUNCIL: A
GERMAN ExPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1928).





This paper deals only with works council and board representa-
tion. In order to explain the new developments in these two fields,
it may be advisable to begin by explaining some of their legal aspects.
Works Council Legislation
In most countries the works council as an institution has been
created to establish good relations between management and the
workforce. The institution is designed to promote cooperation and
solve problems at the shop-floor level. Therefore the works council
in general is not an instrument of collective bargaining. In most of
these countries the exclusive exercise of the right to collective bar-
gaining has been guaranteed by legislation to the trade unions.
This development is partly the result of history: initially, works
councils only received information on technical aspects of the fac-
tory or company. Gradually the amount of information has been in-
creased so that now the information to be given normally includes
economic and financial information. As more rights were granted
to the works councils by legislation or agreement, it became easier
for these councils to engage in a limited process of collective bargain-
ing with management for problems which were immediately connec-
ted with shop-floor activities.
A common expression for agreements between works councils
and management is "Agreement for the Plant" (Betriebsverein-
barung). These agreements, limited to the individual factory or com-
pany, supplement nation- or industry-wide negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements between the trade unions on the one side and em-
ployers associations on the other.
Thus, a "double layer of agreements" is developing. The devel-
opment in the Scandinanvian countries is typical of this situation.
General agreements or laws are particularized by detailed and specific
22. The Commission of the European Communities published a memo-
randum on Employee Participation in Asset Formation (COM (79) 190 final)
(Aug. 29, 1979) which surveys the legislation and systems existing in the mem-
ber states. The memorandum indicates very clearly that the Commission favors
collective funds, into which part of the profits of the companies would have to
be paid. This system is strongly opposed by the employers associations because
of the super bureaucracies which will develop and the ownership potential of
such large funds in industry. See Raskin, Pension Funds could be the Unions'
Secret Weapon, FORTUNE, Dec. 31, 1979, at 64.
l9bul
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agreements for the individual plant or company. This flexible ap-
proach can provide for local necessities, while centralized collective
bargaining agreements cannot. Local differences must be solved
under local circumstances.
23
Worker participation at the shop floor level (or in management)
and collective bargaining coexist in most European countires; these
two different procedures or institutions should not be confused. In
general, both institutions have elements of cooperation and conflict
and both intend to resolve conflicts or ultimately, to avoid them.
Of course, issues that are resolved in one country by collective bar-
gaining mechanisms are resolved in another by participative institu-
tions (such as works councils). The term "collective bargaining"
normally refers to nation-wide or local agreements between em-
ployers and employees, or employee organizations, while "worker
participation" at the shop floor level occurs in the individual factory
or company.
Collective bargaining hardly can be imagined without the exist-
ence of a trade union or some other organization to represent em-
ployees and/or laborers. Conversely, the works council, as an insti-
tution of the factory employees, may exist without the presence
or participation of trade unions. This explains why, in most Euro-
pean countries, the trade unions always have claimed that they are
the exclusive representative of all employees, regardless of the size
of the membership in the trade unions or the degree of unionization
in the respective country. This claim or demand of the trade unions
has been termed "one channel representation," and in some coun-
tries, especially the United Kingdom, it has resulted in strong oppo-
sition by trade unions to works councils; these trade unions believe
in polarization instead of cooperation. 24 It is obvious that trade
unions which believe in opposition to the employers cannot consider
employee representatives (works councils) as suitable instruments for
solving shop floor problems. They are wary of the works councils
23. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
PROSPECTS FOR LABOUR/MANAGEMENT CO-OIPERATIO'N IN THE ENTERPRISE 48-49
(1974).
24. C. McClure, Die betriebliche Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in
den USA (1975) (inaugural dissertation at the University of Bonn) is of the
opinion that American employees have obtained certain, though limited, partici-
pative rights through collective bargaining. See also Summers, Worker Participa-
tion in the United States and the Federal Republic: A Comparative Study from
an American Perspective, 29 RECHT DER ARBEIT 257 (1979).
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developing into institutions for collective bargaining and for the
negotiation of work conditions and wages between the management
of the factory or company and the employees. They do not want
works councils to become the exclusive bargaining partners for
management or employers' organizations, as this would reduce the
influence (and gradually also the strength) of the trade unions.
In countries with "two-channel representation," factory trade union
representation co-exists with the elected works council. Particularly
in countries where legislation for the compulsory establishment and
election of works councils exists, these councils are the representa-
tives of all sections of the workforce regardless of their membership
in trade unions. Trade unions rarely attain such strongly demo-
cratic representation because the members of the workforce nor-
mally belong to different groups of employees or professions. In
some countries, the competing trade unions make universal repre-
sentation impossible.
The existence of "two-channel representation" does not pre-
clude close cooperation between the trade unions and work coun-
cils. The system does not inevitably result in unilateral representa-
tion of the employees through their elected works councils, espe-
cially if the legal basis for the works councils expressly defines their
rights and duties. In countries with such legislation, other regula-
tions normally define the rights and duties of trade unions as collec-
tive bargaining partners of the employers or their organizations.
Since the works council as an institution is part of a system of in-
dustrial democracy, it may well be argued that the work "democ-
racy" in itself requires a universal electorate with voting rights for
every employee. In those cases where voting rights are reserved for
trade union members only, a limited industrial democracy has been
achieved. Full industrial democracy exists only if members of the
work force who are not members of a trade union are not deprived
of their right to elect their own representatives.
Not surprisingly, where national works council systems were
created, either by statute or agreement, trade unions have attempted
to exert strong influence over them. In some countries, the trade
unions enjoy an exclusive or preeminent right to nominate candi-
dates for election to works councils. Even where this privilege does
not exist, the trade unions attempt to exercise an influence on the
election of candidates that is commensurate with their strength in
the enterprise. In countries like Austria and Germany, where the
works council legislation stipulates direct active and passive voting
rights for all employees regardless of membership in a trade union,
union candidates in strongly organized enterprises have a greater
N.Y.J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
chance of election than non-union candidates. Legally, this is "two-
channel representation":
(1) The works council is the democratically elected institution
representing all employees of the enterprise;
(2) The trade union organization in the enterprise primarily
represents its own members as a partner in collective bargaining
agreements which are not negotiated at regional, national, or indus-
trial levels.
Works councils are based legally either on statute (Austria,
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands), or on nation-wide agreements (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden). 25 In Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland, agreements for specific industries, regional areas or firms
are preferred. A combination of statute and agreement has devel-
oped recently in Scandinavia. The United Kingdom also is consider-
ing the possibility of having fall-back legislation concurrent with
voluntary agreements. Whether legislation requires works councils
depends primarily on the national legal system and customs. The
inclination towards legislation also results from an increasing gov-
ernmental intrusion into labor relations and from the state of the
economy.
It is interesting to compare the composition of the works
councils:
In Scandinavia, Belgium and France, the works councils con-
sist of one or more appointed representatives of management and
elected or appointed representatives of the employees. In Austria,
the Federal Republic of Germany and, since September, 1979, the
Netherlands, all members of works councils are elected directly
from the workforce. Here, representatives of management nor-
mally are not present at council meetings. Most trade unions con-
sider this independent, homogeneous works council as the only
genuine employee representative institution.
Great differences also exist with respect to the right and tasks
of the councils. The Scandinavian cooperative council occupies a
unique position here since the agreements expressly describe it as
an institution "to further the cooperation between employer and
employees." This broad description gives the council a mandate
far beyond the tasks enumerated in many statutes; due to this, the
cooperative councils in Denmark, Norway and Sweden have enlarged
25. For an English translation of the laws and agreements of these coun-
tries see w. KOLVENBACH, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES (1978).
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their activities; and, in addition, Sweden has reached an extensive
enactment of their rights.
Councils in countries like Belgium and France are less powerful
and influential. There, employee representatives primarily receive
information and have only limited opportunities to participate in
the decision-making process. However, the amount of information
given to these bodies has grown over the years with trade unions
and employees continuing to demand an expansion of their informa-
tional rights. In all countries, including Austria and the Federal
Republic of Germany with their very extensive council jurisdictions,
the dissemination of extensive information to the workers preceded
codetermination. Presumably, it is with the establishment of a
broad base of information that council members acquire the dual
desire to obtain more data (which they may pass on to their fellow
workers) and to act upon the revealed facts. Therefore, the pass-
ing on of information may be regarded as an initial phase in the
development of works councils -which will extend eventually to
codetermination rights.
Worker participation in the decision-making process
at the board level
James Furlong calls codetermination "the peaceful revolu-
tion," 26  and Robert Ball paints a picture of "the hard hats in the
board room." 2 7  In the name of industrial democracy, an increas-
ing number of European nations are enacting legislation to permit
worker representatives to become members of their respective
boards of directors.
In many of these countries, this new development has had a
strong influence on the economic and managerial decision-making
process, as well as on the legal status of the board of directors. It
has led to the membership of worker representatives in the board
of directors, the Aufsichtsrat, the conseil d'administration or similar
institutions which exist in almost all European company law. These
representatives of the workers either are elected by the workforce
of the company or -are appointed by works councils, trade unions,
or other representatives of the employees. Under our traditional
26. J. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM, THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION
(1977).
27. Ball, The Hard Hats in Europe's Board Rooms, FORTUNE, June 1976,
at 180.
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systems, the members of the board of directors or supervisory organs
of a share-holding company were elected or appointed by the repre-
sentatives of the capital invested in the company, i.e., the share-
holders. Under the new system, the shareholders are deprived
of their exclusive right to appoint these members, with the work-
force being given the right to elect or appoint part of the member-
ship. This is "regulated capitalism." The company is no longer an
instrument of profit maximization for the sole interest of the share-
holders; but the interests of the employees and of the public must
be taken into account. 28  The interest of the employees equals
that of the shareholders. Company law thus has changed its char-
acter. It has developed from company law (droit des societes or
Gesellschaftsrecht) to a law of enterprises (droit des entreprises
or Unternehmensrecht). 29  Given the new approach, management
now has to balance all the relevant interests: those of the share-
holders who demand a return on their investment, the interest of
the employees who demand good wages and job security, and the
interests of the public, speaking for the national interest. Corpor-
ate social responsibility compels management to consider the inter-
ests of the workforce as an important element of that public
interest.
30
The philosophy of enlarged responsibility for enterprises is
expressed in new organizational forms in the various European co-
determination systems. The company is no longer a capitalistic
28. Schmitthoff, Social Responsibility in European Company Law, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 1421 (1979). One commentator has examined the question
whether the German experience of giving the workers and the public a larger
voice in corporate decisions sheds new light in the discussion regarding the role
of the American board within the company. To include the employees in the
corporate constituency has implications for "both corporation law and labor
law; indeed, that it constitutes a new linkage between the two and causes many
of its analytical and practical problems." Vagts, Reforming the 'Modern' Cor-
poration: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 65 (1966).
29. Schmitthoff, supra note 28, at 1422. See also von Falkenhausen &
Stiefel, Shareholders' Rights in German Corporations (AG and GmbH), 10
Am. J. ComP. L. 407 (1961).
30. Roth, Corporate Social Responsibility: European Models, 30
HASTINGs L. J. 1437 (1979). In this context, the development in Norway is
important. There, demands are being made that companies of a certain size
inform and consult with municipal authorities if business matters could be of
importance to the municipality. It was even suggested that these local authori-




organization but a combination of capital and work force. This
combination becomes visible in the allocation of seats on the board
of directors or the equivalent institution, i.e., the legal representa-
tion of the company. The impact of the worker directors31 as
board members depends on the legal system in which they operate.
"One tier" and "two tier" systems play an important role. A
typical "one tier" board organization is the Anglo-Saxon "board
of directors" or the French "Conseil d'Administration"," Luxem-
bourg and Denmark also use this system. Hereunder, the board
or conseil manages the company in all respects. This all-encom-
passing authority includes "supervision," which under the two tier
system is assigned to the supervisory board. 32 The characteristic
legal problems of employee membership in a one tier organization
particularly include individual responsibility of the board members
and liability to the owners, i.e., the shareholders of the company.
33
The two tier system separates the representatives of the share-
holders in the company formally and visibly from management.
These shareholder representatives supervise the management board
which, as the executive of the company, is responsible for the day-
to-day operations of the company. Members of the management
board are appointed by the supervisory board; no one may be a
member of both institutions. The influence of the supervisory board
is important because under many two tier systems, e.g., the German
it approves the balance sheet with the profit and loss statement.3
4
Codetermination legislation gives the employee representatives on
the supervisory board the same rights and duties as the owner repre-
sentatives, including the obligation to keep information confidential.
31. In the United Kingdom, representatives from the labor force are
called 'worker directors.'
32. w. KOLVENBACH, WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE 19 (1977).
The two-tier board model is also discussed by Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of
the Structure of the American Corporation: The 'Two-Tier' Board Model, 62
Ky. L. J. 91 (1973); and Roth, Supervision of Corporate Management: The
'Outside Director' and the German Experience, 51 N. C. L. REV. 1396 (1973).
The French experience with an optional two-tier system indicates that there
exists a certain reluctance to abandon a system to which companies and share-
holders have been accustomed for many years. See Caussain, La Societe a
Directoire: Bilan et Perspectives, 119761 Gazette du Palais (No. 12451) 289.
33. Orr, On Employee Representation and Cooperation, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1977, ajt 37.
34. § 172 Akticngesetz vom 6.9.1965, BGB1 11089.
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Unlike the traditional supervisory board, which was homogeneous,
current boards, because they are composed of these two distinct
groups or "benches," (the shareholder representatives on one side
and the employee representatives on the other side) face conflicting
interests. Confrontations occur but compromises are inevitable if
a board is to remain a viable entity.
Today, there are two options in Europe on codetermination:
a) Codetermination in large enterprises should not be insti-
tutionalized. There should be complete freedom to deal
strongly with the enterprises on working conditions and
other matters. It would not be wise to have a mixed
group of owner and worker representatives on the boards
of such enterprises.
b) Thje second opinion favors institutional codetermination,
a representation of worker interest in the decision-making
bodies of the enterprise, i.e., in the supervisory board.
This would create a co-responsibility for the functioning
of the company. The structure of the company should be
based on cooperation between management, capital and
labor.
The Dutch system is a compromise between these two philoso-
phies. It seeks to avoid the partisan influence of interest groups on
the supervisory board and the subsequent creation of vested inter-
ests. This system is unique in Europe because it has made codetermi-
nation effective without having direct worker representation on the
supervisory board.
The Co-Optation System
. Under the Dutch system the appointment and removal of mem-
bers of the supervisory board is no longer decided by the assembly
of shareholders, but by the supervisory board itself.
The supervisory board nominates candidates for co-optation to
the board. The rationale behind this principle is that the supervisory
board is a team which must safeguard the interests of capital and
labor, which assists management and which has co-responsibility for
general problems of the company.
The principles of this system are:
-Each supervisory board member retires every 4 years, but he
may be reappointed.
-Supervisory board members are no longer appointed or re-




-The shareholders' meeting, the works council and also the
management may make recommendations for appointments,
but the supervisory board is not bound by these recommenda-
tions.
-The supervisory board cannot co-opt a person as a member of
the supervisory board if either the shareholders' assembly or
the works council objects. The basis for objections may be
that the candidate would be unsuitable as a supervisory board
member or that because of his appointment the supervisory
board "would not be properly composed."
-If the supervisory board does not agree with the objection, it
can appeal to the "Social Economic Council." This Council
can declare the objection justified or unjustified. If the Coun-
cil declares the objection unjustified, the candidate nominated
may be appointed by the supervisory board.
This reform deprived the shareholders' assembly of one of its
principal rights and handed these powers to the supervisory board.
It also gave important powers to the works council, i.e. the right to
recommend and to object to membership on the supervisory board.
Thus, the system tries to introduce a combination of capital and
labor as a factor in the company's structure. There are exceptions
to the above rules for international parents and subsidiaries of inter-
national parents, but these exceptions are minor.
Surprisingly, the Dutch system does not give any criteria for
the composition of the supervisory board. Therefore, this will de-
pend largely on the agreement of all concerned and finally, on the
Social Economic Council.
Ideally, the supervisory board should be a harmonious body,
in which individual members do not represent certain sectional
interests. It was intended that there be no bargaining between
shareholders and works councils for the appointment of new super-
visory board members, but such bargaining does occur. All super-
visory board members need the full confidence of both shareholders
and employees. The work of the supervisory board must be guided
by the interests of the company and its business as a whole.
The Commission of the European Community opines that the
separation of management and supervisory bodies is the model which
is "the best adapted both to the needs of large, modern enterprises
and to the requirements of society in general as regards such enter-
prises. "35  Of course, the Commission recognizes the difficulty in
35. Employee Participation and Company Structure, BULL. EUR. COM.
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compliance for those member states which traditionally have had
one-board systems; therefore, for a transitional period, the co-exist-
ence of both systems shall be permitted until the dualist system can
be realized.
In its report, 36 the Bullock Committee proposes the formation
of supervisory boards in British companies. This would facilitate
employee participation in the decision-making process at the com-
pany level.
One more point should be mentioned: the necessity of creating
a democratic substructure for the employee board members. The
Bullock Committee expressed its surprise "that so many people in
this country have placed so much emphasis on works councils and
similar consultative committees." For practical reasons, it is very
difficult to imagine how industrial democracy can work without
democracy at the base, i.e., works councils elected by all employees
of the enterprise. Only democratic structures in the workshop and
at the office level make it possible to appoint candidates for worker-
directors to handle the election machinery. To introduce a country
to the worker-director system without creating such a basic struc-
ture is like building the roof of a house without having built the
basement first. The Bullock Report apparently underestimates
the difficulties arising from different trade unions and other organ-
izations active in the enterprise. If a system of worker-directors is to
function, there must be an interlocking scheme of participating
institutions in the company with a base structure of the works
council type and board membership by employees so as to create a
working relationship between the work force and management.
3 7
The works council can exist without codetermination on the board,
but not vice-versa.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN WORKS COUNCIL LEGISLATION
Two examples of recent developments in employee representa-
tion at the shop floor are the Netherlands and Portugal. While the
Netherlands have completely revised the existing works council
Supp. 8/75, 40.
36. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,
Cmnd. No. 6706, at 186 (1977).
37. Kolvenbach, Participation Below the Board Level, The Times, Feb.
28, 1977, at 16, col. 8.
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the Portuguese Parliament has passed legislation to fill a gap in its
legislative system provided for under its constitution.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands have a long history of works council legisla-
tion.38 The first Works Council Act was passed on May 4, 1950.
3 9
On January 28, 1971 a completely revised Act was passed which
became effective on April 1, 1971.40 Under the first Works Coun-
cil Act, the council was designed to contribute to a smooth operat-
ing environment in the company.4 1  Subsequent changes in in-
dustrial relations and new ideas on the economic order of the coun-
try gave rise to the new Act of 1971. The new Act further formal-
ized the function of the council. It regulated the appointment of
council members through elections and recognized the delegating/
deciding authority of the council on specific matters. Management
was obliged to consult the council and obtain its agreement con-
cerning such items as pension schemes, profit sharing plans and
personnel policy in general.
Over the years, the trade unions became disappointed with
their lack of effective influence in this type of council.4 2 As a
result, in 1973 the Dutch government asked the Social Economic
Council for advice. The presence of a works council generally
is regarded as a positive factor, but, as the report of the Council
in 1975 made apparent, opinions differ with regard to its rights,
competence, structure and procedures. In 1976, the government
presented a revised works council bill containing a number of
structural reforms.4 3  The bill was heavily debated in the Dutch
38. The Dutch Constitution was amended in 1938 by articles 152 and
154, providing for employee participation. Act of Jan. 19, 1939, Staatsblad
100-105.
39. Staatsblad K 170,119501 ILO LEG. SER. Neth. 2.
40. Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, 119711 Staatsblad 54; 119711
ILO LEG SER. Neth. 1.
41. Most works councils members did not consider themselves as repre-
sentatives of the trade unions but as the representatives of their colleagues.
Albeda, Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the Netherlands, 103 INT'L
LABOUR REV. 3 (1971).
42. The opinion of the two largest Trade Union Federations, NVV and
NKV, is reported in 119741 EUR. INOus. REL. REv. (No. 10) 16.
43. Tweede Kamer der Staten-General, Zitting 1975-1976, 13 954.
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parliament; 44 at one time it was expected that, with a change in the
Dutch government, it would be quite a while before the bill would
be passed. However, on July 5, 1979, the new legislation was signed
into law by the Queen.
45
The modifications can be grouped in three categories:
-Application of works council legislation to a greater
number of companies;
-Composition by elected members only;
-Extension of the rights and competences of the council.
The original bill provided for works councils in all enterprises
having more than 25 employees. The new act made works councils
compulsory for enterprises with more than 100 employees. The ex-
tension of the works council legislation to a greater number of enter-
prises was heavily debated until a compromise was reached. The
100 employees-regulation finally was accepted, but, in addition,
the Social Economic Council can, through an ordinance, extend
the application of the works council legislation to companies with
fewer than 1 00 employees.
Management per se no longer is represented in the new works
councils. The previous legislation provided for works councils to
consist of the manager of the enterprise and members elected by
the employees of the company. The new legislation states in revised
Art. 6(1), that the works council consists only of elected members.
Debate on this point was very intensive. Political and scientific
organizations interested in the subject very carefully studied the
situation in those countries, like Germany and Austria, where uni-
lateral works councils, or, as it was called in the Netherlands,
"Zelfstandige" councils, existed. Members of the Dutch councils
are elected for terms of two years each, but the works councils them-
selves may have a regulation extending the term of office to three
years. Generally speaking, all the regulations concerning the elec-
toral procedure were formulated more precisely and extensively.
The new act expands the rights and competences of the works




44. The Dutch public, trade unions and the legal profession discussed
the new principles extensively (more rights for the works council, a unitarian
works council with more independence from management). See, e.g., MULDER.
POPPE, SLAGTER, & TEUNISSEN, DE ZELFSTANDIGE ONOERNEMINGSRAD (1979).




Management and works council must meet at least six times
per calendar year. Management as well as works council may re-
quest additional meetings with two weeks' notification. In all
such general meetings, the members of the supervisory board of
the company also must be present. At least twice per year the
general business affairs are to be discussed in such meetings.
The subjects on which information must be provided have been
extended significantly. Major new subjects under the compulsory
right of information are future plans and projections, semiannual
financial statements and capital investment plans. Interestingly
enough, the works council must be notified as soon as possible of
the intention to hire an outside consultant.
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b) Advisory rights
The works council must be asked for advice on all major policy
questions. These include the sale of the company, merger, closing
down, extensive layoffs of personnel, expansions, changes in organi-
zation and all matters generally concerning personnel policy.
The request for advice has to be accompanied by an explana-
tion of the reasons for the proposed decisions and the consequences
which the decision would have for the employees of the enter-
prise. The works council does not have to comment on the request
for advice unless a meeting with management has taken place. If
there is no agreement between management and works council,
management must delay its decision for one month, during which
the works council may call upon a special court in Amsterdam
for a decision on the proposed management procedure.
During the discussions of the legislation, strong objections
were raised. These clauses were thought to affect the manageability
of the companies in a negative way, especially through the delay of
vital decision-making processes.
c) Agreement rights
The works council must approve of changes in the following
areas: remuneration system, retirement plans, work or vacation
time, management development programs, hiring and firing, pro-
motion policy, handling of grievances and similar matters related
to personnel decisions. If the works council refuses to approve a
proposed change, management may refer the matter to a special
46. Id., Art. 31c.
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commission for a final decision. A decision by management without
the approval of either the works council or the commission is null
and void.
It is important that, under Art. 40 of the new law, the works
council has an opportunity to comment on the intended appoint-
ment of a director of a company. In other words, the management
is appointed by the owners, but the owners must give the works
council the opportunity to register its opinion about the intended
appointment. This comment must be solicited early enough so
that the advice of the works council may influence the intended
decision. The request for advice must be accompanied by informa-
tion explaining the reasons for the intended appointment. In the
light of the entire Dutch system of codetermination, this is cer-
tainly a most important step, one which must be seen in connection
with the co-optation of members of the supervisory board and the
influence therein of the works council. Now, the works council
receives the additional opportunity to comment on the persons who
are making the day-to-day decisions in the company.
In general, it can be stated that the new Dutch law will have
considerable impact on the day-to-day life of Dutch companies. It
has enlarged greatly the rights and duties of the works council, but
it also has obliged management to communicate permanently with
its works council and to discuss with it in advance many intended
decisions. In this respect the new law shows some resemblance
to the Works Council Act of 1972 in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
In early November, 1979, the Dutch government introduced
an interesting new bill into Parliament. 47  If this bill becomes law
there will be four categories of enterprises in the Netherlands:
a) Enterprises with fewer than 10 employees. For these
firms no codetermination is envisaged.
b) Enterprises with 10 to 35 employees. This group com-
prises approximately 20,000 to 30,000 firms. For these
firms codetermination will be introduced by the new
legislation. There is an intention to include an additional
article in the works council legislation obliging the em-
ployer to hold assemblies of the employees at least twice
a year. Affairs of the business are to be discussed in these
meetings. One quarter of the employees may vote to




demand additional meetings of this kind.
c) Enterprises with 35 to 100 employees comprising approxi-
mately 8,000 to 11 ,000 firms. These firms also will have
a works council, the rights of which will differ according
to the size of the firm.
d) Enterprises with more than 100 employees. For these
approximately 4,000 firms, the new Works Council Act
already applies.
The Dutch government is of the opinion that industrial democ-
racy should be introduced into small firms because employees
therein want it even though they are not employed by large compa-
nies. Employees of small firms also must have some kind of oppor-
tunity to influence their companies.
4 8
Portugal
Employee representation at the shop floor level as well as in
supervisory organs of the company was one of the objectives of
the recent Portuguese revolution. Therefore, Articles 55 and 56 of
the Constitution of Portugal, which was passed by the Constitu-
tional Assembly in September, 1975, expressly state that "the
workers have the right to establish works councils for the defense
of their interests and for democratic intervention in the life of
the enterprise." Article 56 provides some details as to the rights
of these works councils.
Workers' commissions were established all over Portugal in
the course of the change of governmental system; their rapid evo-
lution is very interesting. After initial confrontations between
them and management a working climate gradually developed to
the point where now, in most companies, weekly meetings bring
about an understanding of the problems of the business and the
market .49
In January, 1977, the Portuguese Communist Party (P.C.P.)
introduced a bill into Parliament (No. 8/1) proposing to regulate
works councils (Comiss6es de Trabalhadores) as a supplement
48. Prof. M. G. Rood gave a "snapshot" of the present codetermina-
tion situation in the Netherlands and is of the opinion that the works council
legislation will be extended to smaller enterprises. M. G. Rood, Bedrijfs-
democratic: vlag of ladig? (1979) (speech at the Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden on
Nov. 9, 1979, published by Kluwer, Deventer and Boston).
49. TimE, May 16, 1977, at 20 (European Edition).
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to Articles 55 and 56 of the Constitution. 50 To counter this initia-
tive, the Portuguese government submitted a bill to Parliament (No.
43/1) on the same subject; the Commission of Labor (Comissao de
Trabalho) of the Assembleia da Rep6blica submitted a revised form
of the government's draft. After discussion in Parliament, this re-
vised draft was passed on July 12, 1.977.
Subsequently, the President of the Republic refused to sign
this bill because, under Article 277 of the Portuguese Constitution,
all bills must be approved by the President in conjunction with the
Revolutionary Committee. The Committee has the right to make a
decision concerning a bill's constitutionality within twenty days.
In the case of this bill, the Constitutional Commission (Comissdo
Constitutional), pursuant to Article 284 of the Constitution, ad-
vised the Revolutionary Committee on September 16,1977 that the
bill was not in accordance with the Constitution. This finding was
based on a critique of the clauses concerning the election of the
works council members.
Finally, on August 8, 1979, Parliament passed law no. 46/79.51
The election of works councils must be announced at least 15 days
in advance and by at least 100, or 10%, of the permanent employees
of the enterprise. The members of the works councils are chosen
from lists of candidates in direct, secret and proportional election.
The list of candidates requires the signature of 100, or 10%, of the
permanently employed workers. Each employee may sign only
one list.
There is a new feature in this law not found in the first act
of July 19, 1977: "No permanently employed worker of the enter-
prise may be impaired in his right to vote and to be elected and that
is independent of age and office."
Article 18 of the law lists the rights of the works councils:
a) to receive all information necessary for their activities;
b) to oversee the management of the enterprise;
c) to influence the reorganization of production activities;
d) to participate in the development of labor laws and the
economic and social plans of their industry as well as
participate in the establishment of government plans.
It is expressly stated that the works council may not interfere
with normal competences of the administration and technical and
functional hierarchies of the enterprise.
50. Separata No. 1 do Diario da Assembleia da Republica, Jan. 18, 1977.
51. Diario da Republica, Sept. 12, 1979, 2275.
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Meetings shall not take place during normal working hours
and must not disturb the normal working process. Within normal
working hours, a maximum of 15 hours per year may be used for
meetings at the work place, but the normal and important work
must continue without interruption.
Management must give the works council certain information:
a) plans for the enterprise and its budget;
b) internal guidelines;
* c) organization of production and its influence on manpower
and equipment;
d) situation of purchases;
e) planning, volume and development of sales;
f) personnel policy and establishment of basic criteria, total
amount of salaries and hourly wages and their distribution
to the different job categories, social benefits, produc-
tivity, minimum requirements and absence quotas;
g) bookkeeping questions, profit and loss statements, and
balance sheets;
h) forms of financing;
i) taxes and similar contributions;
j) plans for changes in the activity of the enterprise, the share
capital and plans for changing the enterprise's production.
Besides these information rights, the Comiss6es de Trabalhadores
has the duty to comment, in writing, on the following matters:
a) contracts of viability;
b) liquidation or bankruptcy of the company;
c) closing of factories or production lines;
d) any step which results in a considerable reduction of per-
sonnel in the factory or a substantial worsening of the
working conditions;
e) establishment of the yearly vacation plan of the em-
ployees and change in the working time for all or part
of the employees;
f) change of the basic rules for job evaluation and promotion;
g) change of domicile by the factory or business;
h) approval of the statues of government-owned enterprises
and changes thereof;
i) appointment of the management in government-owned
enterprises.
The most important clauses in practice are those dealing with
surveillance of management. Article 26 states that it is the purpose
of the supervision of management (and this is completely. different
from the original Article 25 of the bill which was not approved by
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the Revolutionary Council) to enable the workers to influence demo-
cratically and to participate responsibly in the life of the business, es-
pecially the production process. The law lists a number of excep-
tions to this oversight. These concern industries for the issuance and
production of currency, the nationalized press, scientific and military
research, etc.
Pursuant to their right to oversee management, the works coun-
cils are required to comment on certain business decisions:
a) to evaluate and comment on the financial and economic
plans of the enterprise, especially in connection with pro-
duction plans and their changes and the control over the
implementation of these plans;
b) to supervise the optimal use of the technical, human and
financial resources of the enterprise;
c) to propose to management and the employees measures
for improvement of the qualitative and quantitative pro-
ductivity, especially the rationalization of the production
and technical processes, and the reduction of bureaucracy;
d) to supervise the fulfillment of laws and statutes as far as
they are relevant to the enterprise and the industry;
e) to submit to the competent institutions of the company
proposals, recommendations and critiques concerning the
professional training and further general education of the
employees and, more generally, the improvement of the
working hygiene and security climate;
f) written reports on breaches of the statutes or regulations
of the plant to the competent supervisory bodies of the
company or, if these do not act in a suitable manner, to
the competent governmental authorities;
g) to defend the rightful interests of the employees of the
enterprise as well as those of employees in general against
the managerial institutions of the company and the compe-
tent governmental institutions.
The articles on employee participation in the decision-making
bodies of a company have been completely reworded as compared
with the Law of July 1977. In state-owned enterprises, the super-
vision of management is exercised through the participation of em-
ployee representatives in some body (or bodies) of the enterprise
(Article 30). It depends on the statutes of each of these enterprises
which body is in question, and how many employee representatives
will be elected or appointed by the works council. (This was already
the case in state-owned enterprises, such bodies being either the
general council or the supervisory council. None of them are man-
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agement bodies.) The Article goes on to note that in private industry
the parties, that is the company's shareholders and presumably the
works council, also may reach agreement on this matter. This is
a rather vague and nonbinding clause. Finally, the Article says
that a new act of Parliament may regulate this subject.
A new Article 31 was introduced, but it does not fit very well
under the heading of supervision of management, despite being
covered by the broad scope of Article 26. Article 31 introduces
co-management to the state-owned enterprises, yet, makes no refer-
ence to the private sector. It states that in state-owned enterprises,
the workers must have at least one representative in the management
body. Within 60 days after the effective date of this legilsation,
the workers' commission can take the necessary steps under Articles
30 and 31.52 The remaining articles of the law deal with the in-
tended reorganization of production facilities, another matter in
which the works councils have a profound right of participation and
approval.
As far as the rights and duties of the works councils are con-
cerned, it generally may be concluded that this new Portuguese
legislation stands in line with some of the furthest developed works
council legislation existent in Europe. The clauses regarding em-
ployee participation in the decision-making process at the board level
of state-owned enterprises are particularly important and far reach-
ing. They too determine the close connection between participation
in decision-making processes at the shop floor and board room levels.
As the troubled history of the new law shows, the future of such a
development depends on the political situation in Portugal.
Spain
Joint committees have existed in Spanish enterprises since
1947, 5 3 but the members were dependent upon the state-controlled
trade unions, which could not compare with trade unions in demo-
cratically-governed countries. After the democratization of Spain,
the Spanish Government and the most important trade unions nego-
tiated a new works council system. On December 6, 1977, the
Spanish Consejo de Ministros published a Royal Provisional Decree
(Real Decreto Provisional) regulating the election procedure of
52. Law No. 46/79, Article 40.
53. Decreto of Aug. 18, 1947, 1947 BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTATO [BoL.
o.) 5568.
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works councils, but not their rights and duties. 54 On December 16,
1979, the Spanish parliament passed a "Statute of Employees"
which, according to newspaper reports, contains regulations for
works councils similar to the German regulations.5 5 By the end of
1979, when this paper was finished, the new legislation had not
yet been published.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING EMPLOYEE
MEMBERSHIP IN COMPANY ORGANS
Federal Republic of Germany
To understand recent discussions regarding codetermination
(Mitbestimmung) in Germany, it is necessary to remember that
there exist three different legislations, namely, for
a) companies governed by the Coal and Steel Act of 1951,56
b) companies with more than 500, but fewer than 2,000 em-
employees (Shop Constitution Act of 1952),
5 7
c) companies with more than 2,000 employees (Codetermi-
nation Act of 1976).58
Since the enactment of the Codetermination Act of 1976
(which provided for a transitional period until July 1, 1978) many
large German companies now have supervisory boards with half of
the seats occupied by employee-elected members. To recapitulate,
54. For an English translation of this provisional decree, see W. KOLVCN-
BACH, EMPLOYEE COUNCILS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES, 247-251 (1978)
55. Spanien hat ein neues Arbeitsqesetz, Frankfurter Allgemeinc
Zeitung, Dec. 17, 1979, at 12.
56. Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnchmer in den Aufsichts-
raten und Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl
erzeugenden Industrie, BGBI 1 1951.347, with amendment of Aug. 7, 1956,
BGBI 1 1956.707.
57. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz vom 15.1.1972, BGBI 1 1972.13.
58. Gesetz uber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4.5.1976,
BGBI 1 1976.1153. For English transations of this important Act, see D.
HOFFMAN, THE GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION ACT 1976 (1976); H. SCHNEIDER &
D. KINGSMAN, ACT CONCERNING CO-DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYEES (1976). For
summaries of this new law in English, see Gruson and Meilicke, The New Co-
Determination Law in Germany, Bus. LAW. 571 (1977); Trott, Co-Determina-




the essentials of the new act are as follows.
The act affects all companies regularly employing more than
2,000 employees which have the legal form of either the share
company (Aktiengesellschaft), the partnership limited by shares
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien), or the company with limited
liability (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung). At least 600 to
700 German companies practice this form of codetermination.
Under this Act, the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) must have
12 members if the company regularly employs fewer than 10,000
people. Of these 12, six are to be representatives of the shareholders
and six representatives of the employees.
In companies which have between 10,000 and 20,000 em-
ployees, there are 16 members in the Aufsichtsrat. Eight of these are
appointed by the shareholders and eight by the employees.
Large companies which regularly employ more than 20,000
people have an Aufsichtsrat of 20 members. Ten of these are drawn
from the shareholders and 10 from the employees.
It is interesting to note the special provision for a business con-
cern controlling a group of companies. All employees of the compa-
nies affiliated inside Germany are eligible to vote for the Aufsichtsrat
of the parent company.
For the employee members of the Aufsichtsrat, the law differ-
entiates between three categories:
a) Employees working in the company. They must be 18
years old and have been-with the company for at least one
year.
b) Representatives of the trade unions. This includes officials
of all trade unions, which are "represented in the com-
pany," i.e., trade unions which are active in the company.
c) Senior employees, management personnel, or decision-
making key personnel (leitende Angestellte). The defini-
tion for this group is rather complicated and there already
exist decisions of the German Supreme Labor Court
interpreting it.
Dependent upon the size of the Aufsichtsrat these groups are
represented as follows:
An Aufsichtsrat with 6 employee members has 4 employee
members working in the company and 2 trade union representatives.
An Aufsichtsrat with 8 employee members has 6 employee
members working in the company and 2 trade union representatives.
An Aufsichtsrat with 10 employee members has 7 employee
members working in the company and 3 trade union representatives.
Among the employee members working in the company there
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must be at least one "LeitenderAngestellter." The relationship be-
tween the employee members and the senior employees depends
upon the numerical relationship between the members of these two
groups of employees within the company. Furthermore, at least
one blue-collar worker must be an employee member of the board.
The election of the employee members takes place, not directly,
but through electors. While companies with fewer than 8,000 em-
ployees may hold direct elections, the employees of these companies
also normally opt for the electorate system.
In companies employing more than 8,000, the employees have
the opportunity to vote for a direct election without electors. The
German trade unions strongly favored the elector system. It there-
fore came as a great surprise when, in two large German chemical
companies, the employees voted in favor of direct elections. At
BASF, 54 percent of the employees voted for direct elections. At
DEGUSSA, the percentage was even greater: 88.3. 5 9  Employees
in Hapag Lloyd, Michelin Germany and Woolworth Germany also
voted for direct election.
60
These results can be considered a defeat for the trade unions
who had hoped to have a stronger influence on the electors than with
direct elections. Critics of this procedure always had pointed out
that direct election is more democratic.
Decisions of the Aufsichtsrat usually are by majority vote.
Since there are even numbers of members (12, 16, or 20), an equal
vote would result in a deadlock. To prevent this, the Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz (Codetermination Act) provides that a second poll is
to be held and in this second poll the chairman has a double or tie-
breaking vote. This double vote gives the shareholders' bench a
slight edge for the chairman of the board is always a shareholders'
representative.
The Aufschtsrat appoints the members of the management
board (Vorstand) with a two-thirds majority. If a two-thirds ma-
jority cannot be achieved, a committee appointed from among the
members of the Aufsichtsrat votes within one month. If this com-
mittee does not reach agreement, the tie-breaking vote of the chair-
man is decisive, i.e., the chairman and, thereby, the shareholders,
in the end, appoint the members of the management board.
There must be a labor director on the management board of
virtually every company falling under the act. He is a full member
59. Frankfurter AlIgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 5, 1977, at 13, col. 3.
60. Wirtschaftswoche, Jan. 13, 1978, at 16.
I Vol. I
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
of the board. The term "Arbeitsdirektor" has been borrowed from
the Coal and Steel Codetermination Act. However, in the coal min-
ing and steel industry, the labor director cannot be appointed against
the vote of the employee members of the board. Under this Act, the
labor director is an ordinary member of the management board and,
therefore, he can be elected even if the employee members of the
Aufsichtsrat vote against him. This has led to difficulties in some
companies, when the trade unions wanted to enforce the election
of their candidate.
Is the Codetermination Act of 1976 Constitutional?
Beginning with the parliamentary proceedings,6 1 and continu-
ing after the legislation had come into effect, strong objections
against the parity concept were raised. It was argued that this con-
cept conflicted with the German Federal Constitution because it
prejudices the shareholders' final right of decision and interferes
with the autonomy of both unions and management to bargain
collectively,62 as guaranteed by the country's Basic Law (Grund-
gesetz). Article 14 of the German Constitution grants the right to
own property. The use of property is not without restriction;
certain social limits exist. It was argued that the value of the prop-
erty of the shareholders is diminished without compensation being
61. The question of who has the final decision-making power has pro-
voked a great deal of discussion. See Mooney, A Delicate Balance: Equal
Representation for Labor on German Corporate Boards, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J.
352 (1975). Another commentator argued strongly that the Act brings about
an encroachment on the rights of American shareholders in violation of the
German-American Commercial Treaty of 1954. Wengler, Parity Codetermi-
nation in West German Companies and International Law, 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976). This point was heavily debated in Germany. By
granting a double vote to the chairman of the supervisory board, the Bundestag
sought to avoid a constitutional challenge to the law.
62. Osso Esser, President of the Confederation of German Employers'
Associations asked, "what limit does free bargaining impose on the development
of the controversial principle of workers' codetermination?" In his opinion the
parity codetermination realized through the new legislation infringes upon the
principle of free bargaining and therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court has
to decide "whether the political legislator has remained within the bounds set
by the constitution." Parity Codetermination Endangers Wage Negotiation
Autonomy, COMMERCE IN GERMANY, April 1978, at 15.
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provided for this kind of expropriation. Thirty German industrial
associations and nine large companies, all falling under the Co-
determination Act of 1976, sued before the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) at Karlsruhe, a procedure which,
under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, clarifies
the coristitutionality of legislation.
6 3
In its decision of March 1, 1979,64 the Court held that the
1976 Codetermination Act does not violate any constitutional
rights, especially not those of shareholders and employers. The
Court stated that the chairman of the supervisory board, who is
always a representative of the shareowners, by virtue of this second
and deciding vote, thereby preserves the shareholders' right of ulti-
mate control. The Court also came to the conclusion that the consti-
tutional guaranty for employers' organizations and trade unions re-
garding their collective bargaining autonomy is not affected by the
new law precisely because the ultimate decision regarding the
appointment of members to the management board, who are in-
volved in these negotiations, rests with the shareholders again, if
necessary, by recourse to the double vote. The utilization of the
double vote is not an extraordinary and "hostile" step but the use
of a right which the law grants to the chairman of the board for
very important reasons: to safeguard the ultimate decision-making
rights of the owners of the company. The decision encourages
owner representatives and employee representatives on the super-
visory boards to cooperate and to make the law workable.
The importance of the decision for future codetermination
discussions in Germany and very likely also in the European Com-
munity is to be found in the statement of the Court that the so-
called "full parity," i.e., the abolition of the double vote of the
chairman would be a violation of the constitutional ownership
guaranty. 65 Thus, the Federal German Constitutional Court erected
63. Art. 93,2 and 4a, Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
jGGI vom 23.5.1949, BGB1 1949.1.
64. 50 Entschcidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts IBVerfGEI
290-381 (1979).
65. "The Legislator remains within the limits of permissible content
and border definitions if the codetermination of employees does not lead to a
situation in which decisions regarding the capital invested in the enterprise can
be made against the will of the shareowners; if the shareowners are not deprived
because of codetermination of the control to choose the management of the
enterprise and if they retain the right of final decision." Id. at 350.
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a dam against the desires of the trade unions to extend the new law
to full parity or even beyond this.66  However, the Court advised
owners and trade unions alike: "If there exists on both sides (of the
board) a readiness for loyal cooperation, codetermination will have
a different result than if the atmosphere in the company is domi-
nated by mutual distrust or hostility."
67
Does the new Code termination System work?
The experiences gathered at the first election of the employee
members under the Codetermination Act of 1976 already present
some interesting aspects: one of the seats allocated to the trade
union on the board of DuPont Germany was filled by the General
Secretary of the International Chemical and Energy Workers' Federa-
tion. The workers of Ford in Germany elected as a member of the
supervisory board the General Secretary of the International Metal-
workers' Federation; the Assistant General Secretary of this inter-
national trade union organization was elected to the board of Stan-
dard Electric Lorenz, a company of the ITT-group. This new "trade
union jet-set'' 6 8 will contribute to the union's influence on the
board, but it may also result in problems for the international trade
union movement, especially in conflict situations such as investments
abroad or plant allocations.69 Eugen Loderer, the President of the
powerful metalworkers trade union (I. G. Metall), sits on the board
of Volkswagen, an important factor with regard to the question
whether Volkswagen would have built a U.S. factory earlier than
it did. Another conflict situation: can a member of the board
like the regional head of the IG Metall organize strikes directed
against Daimler-Benz, the company where he has duties as a board
member?
70
Another aspect is that the election procedure is of very long
duration. In extreme situations, up to 56 weeks are necessary for
the various possibilities which the law foresees. Needless to say
66. james Furlong believes that the court's decision is likely to intensity
a broad interest in codetermination. Workers in the Boardroom, Wall St. J., Mar.
12, 1979, at 18, col. 3.
67. 50 BVerfGE 290, 331 (1979).
68. ECONOmST, Oct. 15, 1977, at 89.
69. Rowan, The Socio-Economic Environment and International Union
Aspirations, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.. Winter 1978 (Vol. 1 3, No. 4) at 111.
70. Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Mar. 24-25, 1978.
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the costs of the elections can run very high, especially if the indirect
(elector) procedure is used. Large companies with many subsidiaries
and factories inside Germany have to spend millions of Deutsche
Marks for travel expenses, printing costs and last, but not least, work-
ing hours.
In most Germany companies affected by it, the new system
has been in operation now for two years. Of course, there were diffi-
culties in the beginning, sometimes due to lack of experience or even
lack of good will. Emotions ran high, but by and large, a working
climate has taken over. Now, however, it is apparent that the Co-
determination Law of 1976 has not been incorporated into German
company law. The Act was a compromise between the governing
Social Democratic-Liberal coalition on one side and the German
trade unions on the other side. Already, in its statement on the
motives of the Bill, the Bundesregierung informed the Bundestag:
"The purpose of the bill is to regulate codetermination by the
employees and to retain, as far as possible, the company law already
in effect. There is no intent to effect an extensive revision of the
law of the enterprise. ' 71 The government continued by stating that
the development and incorporation of the law of the enterprise to
a modern system fitting the economic and social developments of
our time will be a long-lasting task. A commission of experts
(Unternehmensrechtskommission) was assembled to study the
relevant legal problems. One of the major tasks assigned to the
commission was the study of the "organization of the enterprise,
including the rights of owners and employees." 7 2  After almost
eight years of work, on December 18, 1979, the commission sub-
mitted its report to the Minister of Justice, Dr. Vogel. The com-
mission could not agree on recommendations but did state ex-
plicitly that the existing Codetermination Acts, especially the
Act of 1976, were not included in the work of the commission,
because the existing codetermination law had been "pulled over"
the company law. The commission therefore studied the possi-
bility of an organic combination of codetermination legislation
and company law.
73
71. Deutscher Bundestag, 7.Wahlperiode, Drucksache 7/2172, 17.
72. Bundesanzeiger IBAnzj 3 (No. 188, Oct. 8,1971).
73. Press release of the Federal Minister of Justice dated Dec. 18, 1979,
at 4. The report has more than 1000 pages and will be published in 1980. The
commission could not agree on recommendations to the legislature, but the re-
port will provide valuable scientific background material for future develop-
ments of the law of the enterprise.
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The Federal Minister of Labor, who was responsible for the co-
determination bill of 1976, has stated repeatedly that this legisla-
tion would not be incorporated into the company law. Instead, it
would be "pulled over" it to avoid difficult changes and a time-
consuming revision of company law.
74
German company law has been enacted under completely
different circumstances. This has given rise to unique problems,
of which one example may suffice. In order to protect the interests
of the shareholders, management is obli ed to give the supervisory
board virtually unlimited information.'z  The corollary to this
far-reaching informational right is that the members of the super-
visory board must keep such information secret. 7 6 Out of this a
conflict situation has developed: the trade unions are of the opinion
that their representatives in the boards must inform their constitu-
ency of board discussions and also give the trade union members
on the boards the opportunity to report any interesting information
to their headquarters. A typical conflict of this type developed at
AEG-Telefunken, the ailing German electronics firm. After a de-
cision of the board to release 13,000 employees, the worker direc-
tors issued a press release. They claimed that, when it comes to
jobs, their obligation to inform their contituents supersedes any
secrecy obligation.
77
Conflict situations of this kind may be expected in the future.
They underscore the necessity of utilizing the possibilities of com-
pany law reasonably and of reconciling codetermination principles
with the well considered interests of the company.
France
It is surprising that the first legislation passed after World War
II in France, a conservative country, concerned the participation of
employees in the Conseil d'Administration. This can be traced back
to a wording in the preamble of the French Constitution of 1946
(to which the constitution of 1958 refers) which reads as follows:
74. This statement was confirmed in his speech to the Deutsche Bundes-
rat when he introduced the bill there. Bundesrat 404. Sitzung, Apr. 5, 1974, at
112.
75. § 90, Aktiengesetz 1965.
76. § 116 in connection with § 93, Aktiengesetz 1965.
77. Paul, Germany's Requiring of Workers on Boards Causes Many
Problems, Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 1, 29.
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"Tout travailleur participe, par l'intermddiaire de ses d~legu s A Ia
d6termination collective des conditions de travail ainsi qu' la
gestion des entreprises. ' '78
Ordinance 45-280 was passed on February 22, 1945, 79 to
implement the preamble. The ordinance was incorporated subse-
quently in the Code du Travail (itself dating from December 13,
1910). 0  It provides French companies with a limited form of
cogestion. It should be noted here that the French word '.'partici-
pation" includes the concept of "interessement," participation
in the shares of a company, and "cogestion," participation in the
decision-making process.
Another implementation by the preamble of the 1946 Consti-
tution is the legislation concerning work councils (Comit's d'Entre-
prise) for all. companies employing more than 50 persons. Article
L.432-4 of the Code du Travail grants to the Comit6 d'Entreprise
a number of consultation rights. Among these is the right to dele-
gate two of its members to the Conseil d'Administration. These
two members have the right to attend the meetings of the Conseil
dAdministration or those of the supervisory board which might
exist since the introduction in 1966 of an optional dualist struc-
ture for the Soci&te Anonyme. Under this legislation, companies
may choose between the traditional system in which the Conseil
d'Administration possesses complete managerial authority to act
in the name of the company or a system (similar to that found in
Germany) in which a three-to-twelve member supervisory board
is appointed at the share-holders' meeting to select for four year
periods a directoire to manage the company. The two worker
representatives lack an actual vote; the law merely accords them
a "consulting vote." It further provides that if two representa-
tives are delegated to the Conseil d'Administration, one repre-
sentative must be a member of the cadres. In the French context,
this subsumes the classes of senior employees, engineers and spe-
cialists. The other represents the employees in companies where
78. Trans: "Each employee participates through his delegate in the
collective decision on the working conditions as well as in the management of
the enterprise." For a survey on the sociological and political discussions regard-
ing "participation" in France see M. DESVIGNES, DEMAIN, LA PARTICIPATION,
AU-cELA OU CAPITALISME ET OU MARXISME (1977).
79. 119451 Journal Officiel de la R~publique Francaise IJ.O.1 954,
119451 ILO LEG. SER. Fr. 8.
80. c. TRAv., Arts. L.431-1-L.436-2, L.463-1.
(Vol. I
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
the different classes of personnel form separate election groups.
This French form of cogestion is part of the works council
legislation. The regulation for employee members of the Conseil
d'Administration or superviso'ry board is found in few lines only
within the regulations coverning the works councils.
The discussion in France concerning the relationship between
employers and employees had been strongly influenced by the report
which the committee chaired by Pierre Sudreau published on
February 13, 1975.81 This Rapport Sudreau proposes to change the
structure of the various types of French enterprises which originated
in the 19th century and to improve the relationship between capital
and workforce. It recommends a humanization of working condi-
tions in France and proposes changes in French company law. The
report deals with practically all aspects of an enterprise; the sug-
gestions span a wide range, from the improvement of working con-
ditions, and the participation of employees in the share capital of
the enterprise to cogestion and co-surveillance. The Rapport
Sudreau does not recommend real voting rights for the employee
representatives in the Comit d'Administration or supervisory board
nor does it recommend the appointment of members to these two
bodies, though it states that a participation of one third of the mem-
bers could be considered.
This cautious attitude of the Comit6 d'Etude pour la Reforme
de I'Entreprise probably may be explained by the strong opposition
of most French trade unions to the German type of codetermina-
tion. This is a result of their fight for the idea of contrepouvoir.
The committee recommends that employee representation should
be accomplished in the form of a joint exercise of supervisory,
rather than management, functions. Therefore, a distinction be-
tween management tasks, for which the general management is
responsible, and supervisory responsibilities, which would be
exercised by the Conseil d'Administration, is recommended. This
notion of joint supervision stimulated many comments and dis-
cussions subsequent to the report's publication.
82
This co-surveillance was only part of the committee's recom-
mendations for more and better information for employees. Other
recommendations concern a yearly social balance (Bilan Social
Annuel) and improvement of the participation of employees in
81. P. SUDREAU. RAPPORT DO COMITE D'ETUDE POUR LA REFORME DE
L'ENTERPRISE (1975).
82. Le Monde, Feb. 13, 1975, at 30.
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profit sharing schemes.
The French trade unions were partly disappointed by the results
of the report. On the other hand, they doubted whether the recom-
mendations made by the Comit d'Etude pour la R#forme de I'Entre-
prise would be realized within a reasonable time.
83
The French government started work on the realization of some
of these proposals in little steps. In April 1976, President Giscard
d'Estaing proposed an industrial reform to improve the role of em-
ployees in the company without reducing the authority of manage-
ment. The first step in this direction was the law on the Bilan
Social (no. 77-769 of July 12, 1977)84 which introduced into the
fourth book of the Code du Travail a number of regulations for a
compulsory annual social balance, i.e., a report on the social develop-
ment of the company. In all companies with at least 300 employees
the management must establish a social balance which is to be pre-
sented to the works council. This social balance includes all essen-
tial figures which permit the works council to judge the situation
of the enterprise in social matters (Article L. 438-3). Therefore
this balance has to contain information on employment, wages and
salaries, security and hygiene in the enterprise, continued job train-
ing and the living conditions of the employees and their families.
The works council must comment on the social balance; its report
is to be submitted to the inspecteur du travail. In public companies
the social balance plus the comment of the works council is to be
submitted to the shareholders. Transitional regulations provide
that the first social balance is to be made in 1979 for enterprises
employing at least 750 persons and in 1982 for enterprises which
employ at least 300 persons. Although the new legislation en-
countered criticism, 85 it is a steT forward in the accomplishment
of the Sudreau recommendations. 
6
83. See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, WORKERS PARTICIPATION (1976) (statement on the Sudreau Report by M.
Francois Lagranche at the International Management Seminar of the OECD,
Mar. 5-8, 1975).
84. 119771 J.O. 3699.
85. Mythes et realites du projet de "bilan social," Le Monde, No. 23
(1976).
86. Workers' Movement Falters in Europe, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1978,
at D1, col. 1. Jonathan Kandall reported from France that the Sudreau Report
"has become a dead letter because of opposition from employers .. and from
the main labor federations."
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It is surprising to see the attention that the French government
pays to the lower management personnel (cadre). Loi No. 78-587
of January 2, 1978, compels the managing director to study mea-
sures for improving information and consultation concerning general
company policy and for enabling the cadre to exercise more respon-
sibilities in the enterprise.
The next step was taken in Bill No. 324, concerning the partici-
pation of cadres in the Conseil d'Administration and conseil de
surveillance of certain public companies. 88 This bill was presented
to Parliament by the French Prime Minister and the "Ministre du
Travail et de la Participation" (this official title of the French Labor
Minister indicates the importance that is attached to participation
in France), but a decision is not expected before 1980.
The bill proposes that a new Chapter IV be added to the fourth
book of the Code du Travail under the present heading "Participa-
tion des Salaries & la Gestion des Entreprises" ("Participation of
Salaried Employees in the Management of the Enterprise"). In
soci&tUs anonymes with more than 500 salaried employees, the
ingenieurs, chefs de service and cadre administratif, commerciant
ou technique would elect one or two representatives, depending on
the size of the new councils, to the Conseil d'Administration or
conseil de surveillance. The election would take place at least one
month before the general assembly elects the members of the conseil.
The most important fact in the bill is that these representatives of
the cadre would have the same rights and duties in the Conseil
d'Administration as the owner representatives. Thus, administrators
elected by employees would have voting rights in France for the
first time. Also, the profit sharing rules are being expanded in
accordance with the recommendations of the Sudreau Commis-
sion.89 It remains to be seen whether the French government
succeeds in its gradual enlargement of participation rights of em-
ployees in French companies.
Norway
Norway has added a variation to the European worker directors
87. 119781 j.O. 149.
88. Proces Verbal de I'Assemblee Nationale du 6 Juin 1978.
89. In 1975, the French government published all existing regulations
concerning profit sharing and employee participation in the share capital of
companies in the special brochure No. 1317. 119751 J.O.
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systems which is not only unique and interesting, but also has the
advantage of great flexibility because it can be applied to individual
industries according to their necessities and situations. This "intro-
duction of co-determination step by step" permits slow introduc-
tion of the new model and less disturbance of existing structures.
Employee participation in the decision-making process through
formal representation on the boards was established first in selected
state-owned companies in 1965 and has continued on a broader
scale since January 1, 1973. On May 12, 1972,9 0 the National
Assembly, the Storting, adopted some important amendments to
the Companies Act of July 6, 1957. These amendments had been
proposed by the Eckloff Committee. They affected the boards of
companies and their composition and, furthermore, created a new
body, the Corporate Assembly. A Royal Decree (Kongelig Reso-
lusjon) of November 24, 1972 supplemented this law. On June 14,
1974, there was a further amendment to the Companies Act, and a
completely new Companies Act was passed by Parliament on June
4,1976.91 It became effective as of January 1,1977.92
The original rules applied only to enterprises within industry
and mining. By the Royal Decree of November 23, 1973 (now re-
placed by a new Decree of December 10, 1976), special rules for
companies within the building and construction industry were intro-
duced. Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, hotels, and domestic
transportation were also included. As of January 1, 1976, the rules
apply to all companies regardless of their activity, with certain ex-
ceptions (mainly newspapers and other publications, financing and
insurance companies).
At that time, the majority of the Norwegian Parliament was
of the opinion that the formalization of employee participation in
the decision-making process should be extended to as many different
kinds of industries and employee groups as possible. Contrary to
90. Norsk Lovtidend, 23 June 1972, No. 17, 604, 119721 ILO LEG.
SER. Nor. 1.
91. Lov av 4. Iuni 1976 nr. 59 om Aksjesselskaper Ihereinafter cited as
Company Act 19761.
92. For the history of these developments, see the opening addresses
of the Norwegian Minister of Local Government and Labor, the president of
the Norwegian Employers' Confederation, and the first secretary of the Nor-
wegian Federation of Trade Unions (LO) at the Oslo Symposium of the ILO,




other countries where legal definitions have brought compulsory
employee participation in boards, in Norway this has been achieved
through voluntary arrangements or agreements which were nego-
tiated under the supervision and with the intervention of the
"Kommunal-og-Arbeidsdepartement." A few of these arrangements
are:
-Two agreements of 1974-1975 covering consumer coopera-
tion enterprises and institutions within farming (which are
not in the form of a company).
-A 1974 agreement covering part of the newspaper industry.
-- Agreement and individual arrangements covering major parts
of the insurance companies.
-A white paper to Parliament in November 1976 concerning
all employees in public administration and enterprises which
are not covered by special legislation.
9 3
-Committee report to the Norwegian Government of January
1977 concerning employee and additional public representa-
tion on the boards of commercial banks. A similar proposal
has been prepared for savings banks.
94
-In the spring of 1977 a committee report concerning em-
ployee representation in enterprises which are not organized
as joint stock companies.
The existing regulations provide that in small companies (fewer
than 50 employees) the company statutes may determine that the
employees of the company elect members to the company board.
In these small companies, workers' representation is, therefore, the
result of voluntary negotiations between the parties within the
company.
In medium-sized companies (50 to 200 employees) representa-
tion of employees on the board is compulsory if more than 50% of
the company's employees submit a written demand for it. The
company then has to accept employee representation on the board.
This representation can be up to one third of the members on the
board (at least two directors). 9 5 In companies with a share capital of
more than 400,000 nkrs the board must have at least 3 members
and, if they so choose, 2 additional employee representatives. The
basic rule is that the majority of the board always must be elected
by the shareholders.
93. St. Meld. No. 28, 1976-77.
94. NOU 1976:52.
95. Section 8-17, Company Act 1976.
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In companies with more than 200 employees, a Corporate
Assembly (Bedriftsforsarnling) of at least 12 members will be
elected. 9 6  Two thirds of the members, with deputy members,
are elected by the General Assembly. One third of the members,
with deputy members, are elected by and from among the em-
ployees. If the company belongs to a concern or other group of
companies, to which the company is bound through common
owners' interest or joint leadership, a majority of the employees
within the concern or group of companies may demand a com-
mon representation for all the employees within the concern or
grou p.
The Corporate Assembly elects the board of directors, which
will consist of at least five directors. If one third of the members
of the Corporate Assembly so demand, the election of the directors
shall be governed by the principle of proportional representation.
Thus, one third of the directors would be employees.
The Corporate Assembly may adopt recommendations to
the board on any matter. At the proposal of the board, the Cor-
porate Assembly adopts resolutions in matters concerning sub-
stantial investments, rationalization and restructuring of operations
if this results in a major change or reallocation of the workforce.
The Corporate Assembly is a controlling, supervisory organ.9 7
The board of directors executes the day-to-day management. In
companies with a share capital of more than 1 million nkrs the board
of directors must delegate part of its role to management, or to a
president or managing director. However, the board retains responsi-
bility for what it has delegated.
The description of the existing system would not be complete
without mentioning the permanent influence of public authorities
which is exercised in the decision-making process of Norwegian
enterprises. The government has pronounced a policy that state
ownership in private industry is not to be extended. Nonetheless,
state dominance and control are increasing, partly due to the fact
that the state-owned oil company has heavily invested in the oil
producing and oil using industry.
Furthermore, the Norwegian Government has supported
strongly large segments of Norwegian industry. In this connection,
the above-mentioned proposal regarding commercial banks will
probably eliminate the present voting control by private shareholders
96. Section 8-18, Company Act 1976.
97. Berg, Two-Tier Boards, DIRECTOR, Oct. 1978, at 17.
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in these banks. In various ways the government or other public
authorities either are already represented in the decision-making
bodies of Norwegian companies or are in the process of entering
these bodies.
Against this background, a commission submitted a general
report in February 1977 recommending that enterprises of a cer-
tain size have extensive obligations to inform and consult with
municipal or county authorities as far as matters of importance for
local communities are concerned. It further suggested that munici-
pal or county authorities should have the right to demand repre-
sentation on the boards of directors of larger enterprises within their
community boundaries. While it remains to be seen whether these
recommendations become regulations, this aspect of public repre-
sentation will be of greater importance for the development of
employee participation in the decision-making process of Norwegian
companies. A completely new method of influencing the decision-
making process of companies could result. This new method would
add to the already existing ways to participate in the decision-making
process of companies in Norway.
A further form of employee representation was introduced
by a law of June 10, 1977, which came into effect on January 1,
1978.98 All banks must have a "Repraesentantskab," an organ
which is higher than the General Assembly. This institution decides
on the statutes, increase or decrease of share capital, merger, acquisi-
tions, divestments, etc., with a two-thirds majority. It issues guide-
lines for the business which bind the board and administration of
the bank. Furthermore, it approves the balance sheet and decides
on the remuneration of board members and managing directors.
It also elects the members of the board.
Under the new law, in a Repraesentantskab with 15 members,
8 are elected by Parliament, 4 by the shareholders and 3 by and from
among the employees. The regulations for this procedure state, that
under the new system, the influence of the shareholders will be re-
duced. Therefore, the Norwegian State gave the shareholders the
right to sell their shares to the government at a price, which was
either the quotation at the stock exchange for the day, when the law
came into effect, or the average of the stock quotation for the years
1975-1977.
A shareholders' group sued the government arguing that the
price for the takeover by the government was inappropriate. They
98. Lov av 10. juni 1977 nr. 60.
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claimed that the quotation at the stock exchange had lost a number
of points because of the decision of Parliament and charged that the
average of 3 years was not a fair price, because, given the parlia-
mentary interference, only the real value would be appropriate.
On December 22, 1978, the Court at Oslo (Oslo Byrett) decided
in favor of the shareholders. 99  The government appealed to the
highest Norwegian Court (Norges Hyesterett). On June 1, 1979,
this court overruled the decision of the court of first instance and
upheld the pricing clauses of the law. 100 The controversy is similar
in magnitude to the lawsuit regarding the constitutionality of the
German Codetermination Act of 1976.
It can be expected that the developments in Norway will con-
tinue. The Norwegian Prime Minister recently confirmed that
codetermination rights of the employees will be introduced in the
insurance and shipping industries. Extending this law to companies
with fewer than 50 employees also will be discussed. 10 1  Such
developments would be perfectly consistent with the "step by step"
method adopted b- the Norwegian Parliament.
Sweden
In Sweden, the "Act relating to Board Representation for the
Employees in Joint-Stock Companies and Cooperative Associations"
has been in effect since July 1, 1976.102 This replaced the law of
April 1 1973, which covered companies with 100 employees or
more.10'3 The purpose of the act is "to afford to the employees
insight and influence in respect of the enterprises' activity." The
size of companies falling under the new regulation was reduced
from "100 to 25 employees. Therefore, some 8000 companies
are covered by the new law. The boards of these companies include
two employee members. In addition, the local trade union may
99. Handelsblatt, lan. 4, 1979, at 5.
100. L. No.57 (1979).
101. Nachrichten fur Aussenhandel, Nr. 212, Oct. 31, 1979.
102. 1976: 351.
103. 1972 : 829, 119721 ILO LEG. SER. Swe. 1. A survey published in
January 1976 shows that employees have exercised their right of board repre-
sentation in 82 percent of the 1556 enterprises affected by this legislation.
Swedish National Industrial Board, Board Representation of Employees in
Sweden (1976). For a legal summary, see Garde, Co-Determination in Sweden:
Functions for Boards With Employee Representatives, 8 INT'L LAW. 344 (1974).
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appoint two deputy members, who have the right to attend and
speak at board meetings, even if the normal number is present.
The procedure by which the employee members of the board
are determined is interesting. The act states that decisions on the
establishment of board representation shall be taken by the local
trade union which has a collective agreement with the enterprise and
which represents more than half of the employees in the enterprise.
In other words, the companies' employees must be 51% unionized
to be eligible for two representatives on the board.
Swedish law allocates the central role in codetermination to
the trade unions, while other countries with institutionalized co-
determination award the decisive position to the works councils.
The Swedish variant may be defined as "decentralized co-determi-
nation" because there are regional or other differences in the effec-
tiveness of codetermination.
The trade unions decide whether or not they want to establish
board representation for a company with more than 25 employees.
If they do, then they must notify the board of directors in writing.
In board committee meetings, one employee representative
has the right to be present and to participate in the discussions.
This representative is elected by that union which has the highest
number of organized employees in the enterprise. Employee mem-
bers of the board are not allowed to take part in board deliberations
on matters concerning negotiations with trade unions, giving notice
of collective agreement, or strikes or other industrial action. In all
other matters, the board members of the employees have the same
rights and duties as the shareholders' representatives under the
Swedish Companies' Act of 1975.
On January 1, 1977, a new law came into effect, giving the
employees additional co-determination rights also affecting the
representation of employees on boards of directors. This "Act
on Co-Determination at Work" 1 04 has a highly controversial Section
32:
104. 1976 : 580. This translation of the title is used by Circular Letter
No. 8/76 to the federations and part-owners of the Swedish Employers' Con-
federation (Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen). For summaries of this legislation,
see Wall St. J., June 4, 1976, at 6, col. 3, and BusN"SS WEEK, June 21, 1976,
at 42. For an English translation of the compiete law, see F. SCHMIDT, LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RE.LATIONS IN SWEDEN 234 (1977). In that translation, the title of
the law is given as "Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life."
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Between parties who conclude a collective agree-
ment on wages and general conditions of em-
ployment there should if the employee party so
requests, also be concluded a collective agree-
ment on a right of joint regulation for the em-
ployees in matters which concern the conclusion
and termination of contracts of employment,
the management and distribution of work, and
the activities of the business in other respects.
This act introduced a further mechanism for decentralized codeter-
mination: the unilateral decision of the trade union to expand its
authority to codecide in matters of company management.
1 0 5
Since August 1977,106 the Swedish employers' organization
(SAF) and the trade unions have been negotiating a co-determina-
tion agreement. This agreement would regulate the discretionary
elements in the law. One of the legal problems involved in the
negotiations concerns the transfer of decision-making powers to a
joint management institution or even to the employees. This is
considered to be in conflict with company law, because it would
reduce the authority of management without a concurrent reduction
in their liability under existing company law. Therefore, the Swedish
Parliament had to state that company law enjoys priority.
10 7
Until now, the negotiations have not made progress. The
consequent failure to implement the new law has resulted in the
continuation of present conditions.
108
SAF is of the opinion that the various codetermination issues
cannot be isolated from one another. It continues to favor legisla-
tion for the different levels of codetermination in the company.
It will be interesting to observe further developments in
Sweden. In the summer of 1978, the Social Democratic Party pro-
posed the introduction of 50/50 representation on boards, initially
for all companies having at least 500 employees. However, this may
105. Swedes Ponder Long Range Effect of Law Giving Workers More Say
in Management, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1977, at 38, col. 1. ("Tihe new law isa
framework document that leaves the details to be negotiated by the LO and the
Swedish Employers' Federation. . . . The law is giving more power to trade
unions.")
106. Mitbestimmungsverhandlungen in Schweden, Neue Zurcher Zeitung,
Aug, 11, 1977, at 11, col. 6.
107. Handelsblatt, July 1-2, 1977, at 5.
108. Schleppende Mitbestimmungsverhandlungen in Schweden, Neue
Zurcher Zeitung, Oct. 21, 1978, at 3; Handelsblatt, Oct. 27-28, 1978.
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have been merely an election campaign argument, comparable to the
proposal for collectively controlled employee investment funds.
Ireland
In July of 1975, the Irish Minister of Labour proposed to
Parliament a bill concerning the election of employees to the boards
of state enterprises. 109  In this proposal the Irish government de-
clared that seven commercial state enterprises should have employee-
elected directors on their boards. Among the state-owned enter-
prises are the national airline Aer Lingus, the British and Irish Steam
Packet Company Ltd. (the B&I Line), the Electricity Supply Board
(or E.S.B.), a sugar producing and food processing company, and a
company producing fertilizer. The total number of workers affected
is estimated at 50,000, covering a wide range of occupations and a
significant proportion of the Republic's workforce.
The bill was passed by the Irish Parliament on April 4, 1977,110
and published under the official title "Worker Participation, State
Enterprises Act, 1977. " 111 The act provides that one third of the
members of the boards concerned will be elected by and from the
workforce. The election is by secret ballot and under the propor-
tional representation system. The employees who are elected will
be appointed as directors by the Minister concerned.
The elected employees hold the office of director for periods
of three years each, and may be reelected. They possess the same
rights, responsibilities, and duties as the other directors and receive
the same fees and allowances. The elected worker directors represent
not only the interests of the workforce, but share with the other
directors the same general responsibility for the overall objectives
of the enterprise and the government policy for the particular sector.
The elected directors are not permitted to participate or assist in
collective bargaining, nor may they vote at the board level on certain
issues, such as employees' remuneration and conditions of employ-
ment. Thus, as far as possible, a conflict of interest is avoided. The
normal standard of confidentiality will apply to elected directors
109. Election of Employees to the Boards of State Enterprises, Proposals
by Minister for Labour Michael O'Leary, T.D., Government Documentation,
July, 1975.
110. See Explanatory Memorandum of 1976 and Second State Speech of
the Minister for Labour (mimeographed).
111. Published in No. 6 of 1977 (Wt. - 800.5/77. Cahill. (7317).G.16).
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because (as the commentary to the bill states) "they will not have
the function of or responsibility for communications between the
board and the workforce."
The commentary stresses the point that the elected directors
will be appointed within the existing single tier board structure. It
further states: "The introduction of two-tier-boards would be an
unnecessary complication at this stage which would not add to the
level of participation. Two-tier-boards (i.e., a legislative system of
separate supervisory and management boards) were not primarily
designed as a vehicle of workers' participation but rather as an at-
tempt to give greater protection to shareholders' interests." The
commentary also points out that the one-third worker director sys-
tem is in line with the general pattern in European countries.
All statements made in connection with the act recognize that
this is the first step in employee representation at the management
level. Further steps will have to follow in due course.
The proposal stated that the provisions for the election of
directors by and from the workforce should be seen in the context
of a broader approach coordinating actions at all levels, and that this
should result in greater management and trade union interest in
progress at other levels, especially in examining forms of worker
participation in management decisions and in considering the devel-
opment of appropriate machinery, such as works councils.
This statement was repeated by the Irish Government in its
White Paper "National Development 1977-1980" of January, 1978:
"This scheme will be monitored closely to see if any changes are
called for in the light of experience, especially in the context of
promoting worker participation in management in the private
sector. I 2
United Kingdom
The "Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Demo-
cracy" (Bullock Report)1 13 was heavily debated in the United King-
dom and comments were made from all sides. CBI (Confederation
of British Industry), which was originally in favor of limited legisla-
tion on worker directors, has meanwhile strengthened its position
against the proposals of the Bullock Report. In its "Programme for
Action" adopted at the CBI's first National Conference in Brighton
112. Government Publications (Prl. 6836).
113. Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSOI, Cmnd. 6707 (1977).
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in November, 1977, it has set a policy which virtually rules out sup-
port for any legislation on employee participattion. 1 14 The Trade
Union Congress (TUC) was more enthusiastic about the majority
report of the Bullock Committee, which was described as an ap-
proach consistently endorsed by TUC. TUC only requested that
nationalized industries should also be included in the future legisla-
tion, to give workers in these industries parallel representational
rights.
1 15
The Labour Government continued its efforts to establish
worker directors on the boards of nationalized industries or services
which it considered as pilot experiments. British Steel Corporation
had already appointed employee directors in 1963 on the basis of
a recommendation of the Organizing Committee of the British Steel
Corporation. 1 16 At first three employee directors were appointed
to each group board for periods of three years each. Then, in 1970,
the Minister appointed one of the employee directors to the board
of the Corporation itself. Now the British Steel Corporation has
17 worker directors in all at various levels, including five on the main
boards. They are presently paid £ 1500 per year for their duties. At
first they were barred from holding union office, but this is now
allowed.
17
114. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY ICBI], IN PLACE OF BULLOCK
(May 1977). Another Conference publication states:
The majority Bullock Report, around which so much controversy
has centered over the past year, was not about participation but
about trade union control. This is one reason why it aroused so
much hostility not only among employers and in the media but also
among a large number-perhaps a majority-of politicians employees
and even trade unions themselves. Clearly "industrial democracy"-
if by this we mean employee representatives on company boards and
transfer of substantial corporate power from shareholders to em-
ployees-is a concept which British companies and the British public
are not yet prepared to accept.
CBI, BRITAIN MEANS BUSINESS 1977 at 49 (November 1977). But, on the other
hand, CBI favors voluntary agreement and representation of all employees.
"Participation must continue to be built from the bottom." Id. at 50.
115. TRADES UNION CONGRESS [TUC] GUIDE TO THE BULLOCK REPORT
ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, (February 1977).
116. T. JONES, EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS IN THE BRITISH STEEL CORPORATION,
PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY, 83 (1973).
117. In a letter of Feb. 15, 1978, British Steel Corporation stated that
since its earliest days the Corporation has had an employee as a member of its
main board.
This representative's function has not been advisory but he has
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After three years of negotiations, on January 1, 1978 worker
directors were appointed to the board of the post office, where they
have equal representation with management. The composition of
the board is broadly similar to the Bullock Report's formula 2X + Y,
even though the government at that time disclaimed any connection
with the Bullock proposals. Management and the Trade Union ap-
point the two X components, and the independent Y members are
appointed by the Secretary for Industry in order to allow him to
fulfill his reponsibilities for the Post Office to Parliament. It is no
secret that the British Government used some pressure to speed up
negotiations between the old Post Office Board and the postal
workers' union, obviously in order to set an example of industrial
democracy in another public service.
1 18
In September, 1979, the industry secretary announced a review
of the Post Office's worker director experiment.
] 19
In May, 1978, the British Government published a White
Paper 12 0 in which it recognized that there have been sharp divisions
of opinion on the recommendations of the Bullock Committee's
report. It puts on record the government's view that the develop-
ment of employee participation in decisions affecting workers'
lives and jobs is no longer a question of "if" but of "when and how."
The paper proposes that employers in companies employing more
than 500 people in the UK should be put under a legal obligation
to discuss with employees' representatives, before decisions are
made, all major proposals affecting the employees of the business.
As to the mechanics, the White Paper proposes a "Joint Representa-
tion Committee." Concerning board level representation, the govern-
shared equally with other Board members the corporate responsi-
bility for the collective decisions of the Board. The main Board also
has as one of its members the former (now retired) Assistant General
Secretary of the main steelworkers' trade union-the Iron and Steel
Trades Confederation. The Corporation has stated publicly that it
would welcome the appointment (by the Government) of more
trade unionists on its main Board.
118. Lloyd, Posting Workers to the Boardroom, Fin. Tim(.s, Jan. 6, 1978,
at 9, col. 1.
119. Worker Directors are Likely to Become Rare Breed, Daily Telegraph,
Sept. 14, 1979. (Reports that it was suggested that the introduction of the Post
Office's worker director experiment had coincided with a rapid deterioration in
industrial relations.)
120. Industrial Democracy, HMSO, London, Cmnd. No. 7231.
[ Vol. I
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
ment admits that the consultations following publication of the
Bullock Report did not result in consensus on the principle, but the
British Government expresses the opinion that it would not be
satisfactory to rely entirely on voluntary progress and therefore
proposes that, when employees wish it, they should ha{'e a right
to representation on the board of their company.
Among the proposals contained in the White Paper, the two-
tier-board structure is suggested to be optional for the company.
Members of the board of directors must have the same legal duties
and responsibilities. Employees in companies employing 2000 or
more people in the UK should have a statutory right to have em-
ployees of the company on the board of directors. To begin with,
the employees should elect up to one third of the members of
the board.
12 1
The general election which brought the Conservative Party
into power had considerable influence on the discussion concerning
industrial democracy in Great Britain. The efforts to create new
legislation on collective bargaining, to restrict the powers and mech-
anisms of the trade unions, will certainly play the major role in
British labor relations for some time to come. Industrial democracy
will therefore remain a very remote goal for the foreseeable future.
Further developments are difficult to predict. Mr. Jim Prior,
Employment Secretary, seems to favor the acquisition of shares
by the employees as a means to further their influence in the com-
pany's decision-making process. It therefore seems that employee
share ownership will become easier. Another idea is to revise com-
pany law proposals prepared by previous Conservative and Labour
administrations to require statutorily that company directors take
the interests of employees as well as those of shareholders into
account.
122
The European Economic Community
The European Commission has strongly committed itself to
the promotion of industrial democracy because, among other rea-
sons, it wants to further a Common Market for companies through
harmonization of company laws. It has proclaimed employee
121. For a summary of the White Paper proposals, see Youngman, Indus-
trial Democracy, 6 INT'L Bus. LAW. 683 (1978).
122. Give Workers a Say, Urqes Prior, Fin. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, at 8,
col. 6.
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participation as a fundamental objective of the European Com-
munity, partly because most of the Community's member states
have some kind of employee participation at the board level either
in the form of employee board members without voting rights (as
in France) or with full voting rights (as in Denmark, Luxembourg,
and some of the countries dealt with herein). Most of the member
states with employee participation at the board level have favored
the one third model which, outside of the Community, is used in
Austria, Sweden, Norway, and, to some extent, Spain. Therefore,
it is not surprising that this one third model plays an important
role in discussions in the European Economic Community and the
European Parliament.
In 1972 the Commission published the "Proposal for a Fifth
Directive Regarding the Structure of Socit~s Anonymes and the
Powers and Obligations of their Organs." 1 23 The stated purpose was
to "coordinate the safeguards which, for the protection of the
interests of the members and others, are required by companies
of member states within the meaning of the second paragraph of
Article 58 of the Treaty."
Under this proposal the member states may choose between
two models for the legislative determination of board membership.
In the first, the appointment of members of the supervisory board
is made partly by the general assembly of shareholders and partly
by the employees. The employees elect at least one third of the
total membership. Under the second model, the board is composed
by way of co-option (Dutch model).
Discussion of the proposal for the Fifth Directive was intensi-
fied by the "Green Paper. "124 In this Green Paper, the Commission
recognized that progress in the field of industrial democracy could
only be made with the passing of a considerable amount of time, and
that only certain minimum standards as to company structure could
be achieved. These should be as flexible as possible, and take the
different national experiences into account.
A further proposal for employee representation on boards is
contained in the draft of the European Company Statute, first
123. BULL. EUR. CoM. Supp. 10/72. For a summary of the development
in the European Community see Constas, The Developing European Community
Law of Worker Participation in Management, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93
(1978).
124. Commission of the European Communities, Employee Participation
and Company Structure, BULL. EUR. CoM. Supp. 8/75.
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proposed by the Commission on June 30, 1970.125 Following an
opinion expressed by the European Parliament in July, 1974, this
proposal has been amended to read that shareholders are to elect
one third of the members of the supervisory board, and the em-
ployees the second third. The two groups of members so elected
then co-opt together the remaining third. These last are to be inde-
pendent of both employees and shareholders, representing general
interests. They must have the necessary knowledge and experience,
and may not be directly dependent on shareholders, employees,
and/or their respective organizations.
126
At its meeting of April 26, 1979, the Legal Affairs Committee
of the European Parliament adopted a report in which it submitted
a motion for a resolution to the European Parliament. 127  The
Committee rejected the co-option model, which it did not consider
"a genuine form of employee participation in the organs of the
company, since there is no point in employee representation in the
organs of the company unless employees are free to elect candidates
who enjoy their confidence." It drew attention to the close inter-
relationship between the proposal for a Fifth Directive and the
proposal for a Statute for European Companies, urging them upon
the Council of Ministers. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Council
has sole legislative jurisdiction in Common Market Affairs.
Article 2 of the draft establishes the concept of the dualistic
structure of the company (management organ and supervisory
organ). The Committee reworded this article to read that the mem-
ber states can choose between the dualist system and a unitary
system with a single administrative organ during a transitional
period of five years. It further amended the draft by introducing
the concept of the Labor Director (Arbeitsdirektor), as it exists
in the German coal and steel industries.
At the session of May 7, 1979, the President of the Parliament
formally announced the receipt of the Legal Affairs Committee's
report.T28 On May 10, "the President announced that the motion
for a resolution together with the amendments that had been
125. An amended proposal was published in ButL. EUR. COM. Supp. 4/75.
126. Art. 75a.
127. European Parliament, Working Documents 1979-1980, Document
136/79 of May 7, 1979. The Economic and Social Committee had prepared its
opinion at its 155th Plenary Session, held in Brussels, Feb. 1-2, 1978. 22 o.i.
EUR. CoMM. (No. C 90) 2 (1979).
128. 22 0. J. EUR. COM. (No. C 140) 7 (1979).
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tabled to it would be put to a vote at the beginning of the next day's
sitting." 1 29  A quorum call on May 11 failed to raise the number
of members required under the Rules of Procedure, and the vote
was therefore placed on the agenda of the next sitting.130 The
Parliament adjourned at the end of this day and a new European
Parliament was elected, the first to be chosen by direct universal
suffrage. This new Parliament convened for the first time on July
17, 1979.131
On September 26, the chairman of the German Trade Union
Association (DGB), Heinz Oskar Vetter, attempted to bring the
resolution to a vote in the new Parliament. 13 2 The draft of the
Fifth Directive was referred back to the Legal Affairs Committee
for consideration. In the new Committee, the rapporteur Manfred
Schmidt, a German Social Democrat, had been replaced by the
Dutch Liberal Aart Geurtsen. According to newspaper reports,
discussion of the draft will take place in the Parliament's plenary
session in February 1980.133
CONCLUSION
A summing-up of the existing European models and systems
for worker directors or employee participation on supervisory
boards shows that the various systems are strongly influenced by
national developments. It will therefore be difficult to find a com-
mon system for all European countries or all member states of
the European Community. Of utmost importance will be the ques-
tion whether the board system practiced in some countries (e.g.,
the United Kingdom) is suitable for having worker directors who are
theoretically to be involved in the day-to-day management of the
company. The supervisory board model is better suited to having
employee representatives among its members. This is due to the
limited duties the supervisory board normally has in the company
laws of the countries involved.
Industrial democracy has become one of the major topics
129. Id. at 89.
130. Id. at 95-96.
131. Id. at 182. Keine Mitbestimmung durch die Europa-Tur, Frank-
furter AlIgemeine Zeitung, May 14, 1979, at 11, col. 1.
132. Handelsblatt, Sept. 27, 1979, at 1.
133. Blick durch die Wirtschaft, Oct. 15, 1979.
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of the 1970s, and it can be expected that the discussions will con-
tinue during the next century. The practical experiences collected
so far in those countries whose commitment to industrial democracy
is broad and long-standing have shown that industrial democracy
institutions, especially worker directors, cannot be introduced into
company laws without adjusting all other clauses of the law, thus
affecting the rights and duties of all board members. This will also
be a necessity in countries like the Federal Republic of Germany,
where the present regulations are working, but where also experience
shows that it is not possible merely to "pull" co-determination
legislation over the existing company laws.
Experience has further shown the worker directors require a
constituency, one they can only have at the shop floor level. There-
fore, the institutionalization of shop floor level employee repre-
sentation is a first step toward the development of higher organi-
zational institutions: worker directors as participants in the decision-
making process of the company.
